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Contract Unconscionability in India
MANMOHAN LAL SARIN*
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
When Queen Elizabeth of England passed the Charter of 1600, it
empowered the East India Company to create laws, in accordance
with prevailing English law, that were necessary for the company's
efficient operation in India. Subsequently, the Charter of 1726 intro-
duced English common law and statutory law to the three Indian
Presidency towns of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, resulting in
much confusion among the native inhabitants.
The Statute of 1781 introduced customary laws designed to re-
solve disputes. Prior to the passage of this statute, English law ap-
plied indiscriminately to Hindus and Mohammedans alike.' The
1781 statute empowered the courts of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras
to resolve all disputes among the inhabitants regarding matters of suc-
cession, inheritance, rentals, and contract under Hindu law in cases
involving Hindus, and Mohammedan law in cases involving Moham-
medans. 2 In cases where litigants belonged to different religions, the
courts applied the law governing the defendant.
The Statute of 1862 established the High Courts in Calcutta, Ma-
dras, and Bombay. 3 These courts administered the applicable laws, as
determined by the religion of the parties. In fact, the High Courts
continued to apply sectarian law until the passage of the Indian Con-
tract Act in 1872.
II. ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE INDIAN
CONTRACT ACT
The Indian Contract Act of 1872 was composed of 266 sections
covering such contract elements as the sale of goods, bailment,
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1. HERBERT COWELL, HISTORY AND CONSTITUTION OF THE COURTS AND LEGISLA-
TIVE AUTHORITIES IN INDIA 56 (S.C. Bagchi ed., 6th ed. 1936).
2. Id.
3. An Act for Establishing High Courts of Judicature in India, 1862, 24 & 25 Vict., ch.
104 (Eng.).
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agency, and partnership. The introduction of the Act was greeted
with mixed reviews. The Civil Justice Committee in 1925 remarked
that, while the Act was in some respects farsighted, it was not one of
the best codes, and, in fact, required amendment. Consequently, a
number of attempts were made to improve the law of contract. For
example, after the passage of the Sale of Goods Act of 1930 and the
Indian Partnership Act of 1932, the corresponding chapters of the
Act were repealed.4 The Act does not cover all aspects of contract
law, but, rather, has been supplemented by a number of other stat-
utes. One commentator argued that such statutes should be consoli-
dated and incorporated into the Act.5 The legislative trend following
the enactment of the Act, however, went in the opposite direction.
6
Separate legislation, such as the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881,
continued to be enacted on specific aspects of contractual transac-
tions. In addition, sections of the Act were removed to create sepa-
rate statutes, such as the Sale of Goods Act of 1930 and the Indian
Partnership Act of 1932.
7
The Indian Contract Act of 1872 applies to all Indians, regard-
less of religion. Although the Act is not considered a complete code s
it nevertheless constitutes exhaustive legislation applicable to all In-
dian provinces. In interpreting the Act, it is usually not permissible
to import the principles of English common law, unless the Indian
statute cannot be understood without applying English common law
principles.9
When hearing cases clearly covered by the statute, Indian courts
are not required to refer to judicial decisions. This is because the lan-
guage of the Act has never been modified or enlarged to encompass
the principles or limitations established by the English common law.
Indian courts, however, often rely on English common law principles
regarding contract law where a statutory provision does not cover a
specific issue. Although Indian courts examine and apply the lan-
guage of the Indian Statutes, they often cite relevant decisions of
other commonwealth courts, such as those in Australia and Canada,
as well as courts in the United States.
4. LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, THIRTEENTH REPORT OF THE INDIAN CONTRACT
ACT OF 1872, at 2 (1958).
5. 1 THE ANGLO-INDIAN CODES 534 (Whitley Stokes ed., 1887).
6. LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 4, at 2.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 2.
9. West Bengal v. M/S.B.K. Mondal and Sons, [1962] 1 Supp. S.C.R. 876 (India).
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A. Relevant Provisions Under Indian Law
To fully understand the concept of unconscionability in Indian
contract law, one must examine specific provisions of three different
statutes. These include sections 14, 16, and 19A of the Indian Con-
tract Act of 1872; section 20 of the Specific Relief Act of 1963; and
section 111 of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872.
1. Free Consent
Section 14 of the Indian Contract Act of 1872 defines free con-
sent as consent not caused by (1) coercion, as defined in section 15; (2)
undue influence, as defined in section 16; (3) fraud, as defined in sec-
tion 17; (4) misrepresentation, as defined in section 18; or (5) mistake,
subject to the provisions of sections 20, 21, and 22. In other words,
consent exists when there is no evidence of coercion, undue influence,
fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake.
2. Undue Influence
Section 16 of the Act defines undue influence in the following
manner:
(1) A contract is said to be induced by undue influence where the
relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the
parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and
uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing principle, a person is deemed to be in a position to
dominate the will of another:
(a) where he holds a real or apparent authority over the other,
or where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other; or
(b) where he makes a contract with a person whose mental
capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason
of age, illness, or mental or bodily distress.
(3) Where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of
another enters into a contract with him, and the transaction
appears, on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, to be
unconscionable, the burden of proving that such contract was
not induced by undue influence shall lie upon the person in a
position to dominate the will of the other.
a. Illustrations
(a) A, having advanced money to his son, B, during his minor-
ity, upon B's coming of age obtains, by misuse of parental influence, a
1992]
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bond from B for a greater amount than the sum due in respect of the
advance. A employs undue influence.
(b) A, a man enfeebled by disease or age, is induced by B's influ-
ence over him as his medical attendant to agree to pay an unreasona-
ble sum for his professional services. B employs undue influence.
(c) A, being in debt to B, the money-lender of his village, con-
tracts a fresh loan on terms [that] appear to be unconscionable. It lies
on B to prove that the contract was not induced by undue influence.
(d) A applies to a banker for a loan at a time when there is strin-
gency in the money market. The banker declines to make the loan
except at an unusually high rate of interest. A accepts the loan on
these terms. This is a transaction in the ordinary course of business,
and the contract is not induced by undue influence.
3. Power to Set Aside Contracts Induced by Undue Influence
According to section 19A of the Act, when consent to an agree-
ment is obtained by undue influence, the agreement is voidable at the
option of the party whose consent was obtained. The contract may be
set aside, either absolutely, or, if the party entitled to void it has re-
ceived a benefit, upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
just.
a. Illustrations
(a) A's son has forged B's name to a promissory note. B, under
threat of prosecuting A's son, obtains a bond from A for the amount
of the forged note. If B sues on this bond, the court may set the bond
aside.
(b) A, a money-lender, advances Rs. 100 to B, an agriculturist,
and, through undue influence, induces B to execute a bond for Rs.200
with interest at six percent per month. The court may set the bond
aside, ordering B to repay the Rs. 100 with such interest [as] may seem
just.
B. The Doctrine of Undue Influence in India
1. The General Doctrine of Undue Influence
Section 19A of the Act empowers Indian courts to void a con-
tract induced by undue influence. Yet, even before this Act, the equi-
table doctrine of undue influence grew out of a perceived necessity to
grapple "with insidious forms of spiritual tyranny and with the infi-
[Vol. 14:569
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nite varieties of fraud."' 0 The Supreme Court of India has concluded
that the doctrine is based substantially on the principles of English
common law." In the leading case of Tate v. Williamson,12 Lord
Chelmsford explained the doctrine of undue influence:
[Whenever two persons stand in such a relation that, while it con-
tinues, confidence is necessarily reposed by one, and the influence
which necessarily grows out of that confidence is possessed by the
other, and this confidence is abused, or the influence is exerted to
obtain an advantage at the expense of the confiding party, the per-
son so availing himself of his position will not be permitted to re-
tain the advantage, although the transaction could not have been
impeached if no such confidential relation had existed.13
Section 16 of the Act defines "undue influence" in the particular
context of contracts.14 This "particularization," however, is but part
"of a larger principle."' 15 Justice Tek Chand of the High Court of
Punjab expressed this larger principle in Amir Chand v. Sucheta
Kripalani:16
The legal phrase "undue influence" denotes something legally
wrong or violative of a legal duty. In order to establish undue in-
fluence it must be proved that the influence was such as to deprive
the person affected of the free exercise of his will. It must amount
to imposing a restraint on the will of another whereby he is pre-
vented from doing what he wishes to do or is forced to do [that]
which he does not wish to do.
An advice, argument, persuasion or solicitation cannot consti-
tute undue influence. Honest intercession, even importunity, falls
short of controlling a person's free exercise of his will. A persua-
sion, which leaves a person free to adopt his own course, is not
undue influence. Otherwise a suggestion or an entreaty from some-
body, held in esteem, could be treated as undue influence. In the
absence of proof that a person has been, in consequence of the al-
leged influence, deprived of free agency, no question of there being
an undue influence arises.
It is not objectionable to exercise an influence by acts of kind-
ness or appeals to the free reason and understanding. So long as
10. Allcard v. Skinner, 1886-1890 All E.R. 90, 99 (1887) (Eng.).
11. Ladli Prasad Jaiswal v. Kamal Distillery Co., [1964] 1 S.C.R. 270, 300 (India).
12. [1866] 2 Ch. App. 55 (Eng.).
13. Id. at 61.
14. See Ladli Prasad Jaiswal, [1964] 1 S.C.R. at 299.
15. Id.
16. 1961 A.I.R. (Punjab) 383.
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the free agency of the other person is not prevented or impaired by
obtaining a domination over the mind of another it cannot be
deemed as an exercise of an undue influence. The essence of "un-
due influence" is that a person is constrained to do against his will
[that which], but for the influence[,] he would have refused to do if
left to exercise his own judgment. It has to be shown that a per-
son's volition had thus been controlled by another whereby he
could not pursue his own inclination, being too weak to resist the
importunity and in view of the pressure exercised on his mind he
could not act intelligently and voluntarily and had become subject
to the will of the other who had thus obtained dominion over his
mind.
The term "undue influence" is not susceptible [to a] precise
definition but it suggests the overcoming of the will of one by the
other who superimposes his will on the weaker party despite the
latter's disinclination or effective resistance. Undue influence is a
species of constructive flow. Undue influence is used in contradis-
tinction to proper influence which may be secured through affec-
tion bestowed or from kindness indulged.
A friendly advice or an influence arising from gratitude or es-
teem is not undue influence unless thereby the functioning of a free
mind is destroyed. Mere suggestions or appeals cannot have such
an effect. An influence which exists from attachment or which re-
sults from arguments on appeals to the reasons and judgments is
not undue.
1 7
Thus, under this larger principle, undue influence is found where
coercion and fraud overcome the functioning of another person's free
mind. Once a position of dominance is established, it is deemed to
continue until its termination is established. The person obtaining the
advantage has the burden of proving that the executant adopted the
transaction after the influence was removed.
The doctrine of undue influence applies to transactions that
prima facie reveal an unfair advantage to one party and those in
which an unfair advantage is adduced from the evidence."' The doc-
trine also applies to transactions involving gifts made under circum-
stances that disclose an unfair advantage by one party over the
other. 19
Traditionally, Indian courts have scrutinized cases involving one
17. Id. at 386.
18. See Ladli Prasad Jaiswal, [1964] 1 S.C.R. at 301.
19. Subhas Chandra Das Mushib v. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib and Ors., [1967] 1 S.C.R.
331 (India); see also Allcard, 1886-1890 All E.R. at 93.
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party's spiritual dominance over another, 20 and cases involving un-
scrupulous persons enriching themselves at the expense of expectant
heirs. In such cases, even a trace of undue influence suffices to invali-
date the transaction as unconscionable.
21
2. The Doctrine of Undue Influence as Embodied in Section 16 of
the Indian Contract Act of 1872
The principles underlying the doctrine of undue influence are
embodied in section 16 of the Act.22 The idea of free consent in con-
tracts triggers the possibility that undue influence may arise. Undue
influence arises in this context when one party uses his or her influ-
ence to preclude the other party's exercise of free and deliberate judg-
ment. 23 Similarly, a contract is rendered void whenever a confidence
is betrayed and influence is abused.
24
Section 16 contemplates moral coercion, in contrast to the physi-
cal coercion found in section 15 of the Act. Sir Frederick Pollock
stated the concept of undue influence in his book, Principles of
Contract:
[Undue influence involves] an influence brought to bear upon a
person entering into an agreement or consenting to a disposal of
property which having regard to the age and capacity of the party,
the nature of the transaction and all the circumstances of the case,
appear to have been such as to preclude the exercise of free and
deliberate judgment.
The two elements necessary to set aside a contract under section
16 reflect the basic principles of undue influence. Under subsection 1,
the person seeking to avoid the transaction must prove that the other
party was both in a position to dominate the will of the other,25 and
that he or she used that position to obtain an unfair advantage over
the party seeking relief. Only a person who is a party to the contract
can raise the plea of undue influence and seek relief under section
16.26
The burden of proof in a case involving undue influence occurs in
three stages. First, the party seeking to avoid the contract must
20. Allcard, 1886-1890 All E.R. at 93.
21. Id.
22. For the text of Section 16, see supra part II.A.2.
23. Amir Chand, 1961 A.I.R. (Punjab) at 386.
24. Tate, (1866] 2 Ch. App. at 61.
25. Prasad v. Prasad, 51 I.A. 101, 105 (1923) (India).
26. Subhas Chandra Das Mushib, [1967] 1 S.C.R. at 331.
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prove, either by evidence or by the special presumption of subsection
2, "that the other party to [the] transaction was in a position to domi-
nate his [or her] will. '27 Second, the party seeking to avoid the con-
tract must show "that the other party obtained an unfair advantage
by using that position."' 28 Once these two stages are reached, the bur-
den of proof shifts under subsection 3. The party in a position to
dominate must then prove that "such a contract was not induced by
undue influence."
29
3. Onus of Proof
Section 16(3) of the Act shifts the burden of proof from one party
to the other when a contract is facially unconscionable and the other
party is proven to have dominated the will of the former. A similar
but more widely applicable rule is contained in section 111 of the In-
dian Evidence Act of 1872.
a. The Burden of Proving Unconscionability Under Section 111 of
the Indian Evidence Act of 1872
Section 111 of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872 states that when
a question exists as to the good faith of a transaction between parties,
one of whom stands in a position of active confidence to the other, the
party who is in the position of active confidence has the burden of
proving good faith. The following examples illustrate this good faith
requirement: (1) If the issue of good faith is raised in an attorney-
client transaction, the burden of proving good faith is on the attorney;
and (2) If the issue of good faith is raised against a father by a son
who has recently come of age, the burden of proving good faith is on
the father. While section 16(3) of the Indian Contract Act of 1872
applies only to contract actions, section 111 of the Indian Evidence
Act of 1872 applies to all transactions in which one party "stands to
the other in a position of active confidence."
In India, where a vast majority of the population is ignorant,
illiterate, and blindly follows one spiritual guru or another, there are
innumerable cases of exploitation by spiritual leaders. For centuries,
religious followers have given valuable property in an attempt to
achieve "nirvana" or spiritual benefits in the afterlife. Parties have
attacked these facially unconscionable transactions in courts of law.
27. Ladli Prasad Jaiswal, [1964] 1 S.C.R. at 300.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 301.
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One early case, Manu Singh v. Umadat Pande,30 was decided by the
High Court of Allahabad in 1890. In Manu Singh, the elderly plain-
tiff deeded his entire estate to the defendant, a Brahmin who was his
spiritual leader and who was highly respected in the community.
3'
The plaintiff made this gift to secure benefits for his soul in the after-
life and in response to the defendant's recitation of the holy book
called the Bhagwat Gita.32 Almost immediately, the plaintiff repudi-
ated the deed and sued for its cancellation.
33
The Allahabad High Court held that the fiduciary relationship
between the parties, the improvidence of the gift, the absurd reason
for the gift, and section 111 of the Evidence Act of 1872 required that
the burden be placed upon the defendant to prove that the transaction
was made in good faith and without undue influence.3 Absent such
proof, the plaintiff was entitled to cancel the deed.
35
One class, Pardanashin women, is especially exposed to undue
influence. Since these women do not appear in public and are not
wise in the ways of the world, courts often come to their rescue. 36 As
a result of judicial decisions, every person dealing with a Pardanashin
woman must prove not only that the terms were fair and just, but that
they explained the terms of the contract or transaction and that the
woman understood them.37 The courts impose this burden because
Pardanashin women are "presumed to have an imperfect knowledge
of the world, as by the pardah system they are practically excluded
from social intercourse and communion with the outside world."'38
The special protection accorded to Pardanashin women is based on
the two pillars of justice in Indian law, equity and good conscience. 39
C. Avoiding an Unconscionable Contract
A party who is induced by undue influence to enter into a con-
tract may avoid the contract pursuant to section 19A of the Indian
Contract Act of 1872. The party asserting unconscionability need not
produce direct evidence of actual undue influence. Rather, the court
30. 12 Indian L.R. (Allahabad) 523 (1890).
31. Id.
32. Id at 526.
33. Id. at 524.
34. Id.
35. Manu Singh, 12 Indian L.R. (Allahabad) at 524.
36. See Kharbuja Kuer v. Jangbahadur, 1963 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1203.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. See Tara Kumari v. Chandra Mauleshwar, 1931 A.I.R. (Privy Council) 303.
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presumes undue influence under the assumption that the stronger,
more influential party used his or her superior bargaining position to
obtain an advantage over the weaker party.
Once a suit is filed seeking to avoid an unconscionable contract,
and the plaintiff has discharged his or her initial burden, the defend-
ant must prove by cogent and convincing evidence that the bargain
was fair, just, and reasonable. Mere inadequacy of consideration,
without more, is insufficient to make the bargain unconscionable, 40
though the court may take it into account in determining whether the
consent was given freely. In this respect, the Bombay High Court has
held that "inadequacy of consideration in conjunction with the cir-
cumstances of indebtedness and ignorance were facts from which it
would have been... permissible... to infer use of undue influence. '41
If a contract shocks the judicial conscience, the defendant will
find it difficult to prove that the contract should be upheld. This does
not mean, however, that the defendant automatically loses. For ex-
ample, in loan cases, the lender invariably is in a position to dominate
the will of the borrower and all such transactions can be termed un-
conscionable. The mere fact that the rate of interest is exorbitant is
not enough, by itself, to cancel a contract, unless the plaintiff also
establishes that the lender was in a position to dominate his or her
will. The fact that the borrower was in urgent need of money does
not place the lender in a position to dominate the will of the borrower.
Thus, such a loan will not be set aside by a court even if it may seem
to be unconscionable.
D. Enforcing an Unconscionable Contract
The Specific Relief Act of 1963 specifies the remedies available to
a party, including specific performance, rescission, and cancellation.
Prior to the original enactment of the statute in 1877, Indian courts
were guided by the doctrines that evolved in English equity courts.
The Specific Relief Act of 1963 provides for equitable remedies, and
the grant or refusal of relief is still governed by the principles of jus-
tice, equity, and good conscience.
1. Judicial Discretion in Granting Specific Performance
Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act of 1963 discusses the court's
discretion in granting specific performance:
40. Lakshminarayana v. Singaravelu, 1963 A.I.R. (Madras) 24.
41. Bhimbhat v. Yeshwantrao, 25 Indian L.R. (Bombay) 126 (1900).
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(1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretion-
ary, and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely
because it is lawful to do so. The discretion of the Court is not
arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial princi-
ples and capable of correction by a court of appeal;
(2) The following are cases in which the Court may properly exer-
cise discretion not to decree specific performance:
(a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the par-
ties at the time of entering into the contract or the other
circumstances under which the contract was entered into
are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the
plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or
(b) where the performance of the contract would involve some
hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee,
whereas its non-performance would involve no such hard-
ship on the plaintiff; or
(c) where the defendant entered into the contract under cir-
cumstances which though not rendering the contract void-
able, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance.
Explanation 1-Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the
mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or im-
provident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an
unfair advantage within the meaning of Cl.(a) or hardship
within the meaning of Cl.(b).
Explanation 2-The question whether the performance of
a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the
meaning of Cl.(b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has
resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the con-
tract, be determined with reference to the circumstances ex-
isting at the time of the contract.
(3) The Court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific
performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substan-
tial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable
of specific performance.
(4) The Court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of
a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not en-
forceable at the instance of the other party.
Section 20(2) grants wide discretion to the court to decline spe-
cific performance of a contract that is otherwise valid and enforceable,
solely on the ground that it is unconscionable or works an unfair ad-
vantage to the plaintiff over the defendant. Thus, although mere inad-
equacy of price is not a sufficient hardship so as to refuse the plaintiff
1992]
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specific performance, 42 a court may look at the particular facts of a
case to determine whether the transaction is unconscionable and
whether it should be specifically enforced. It is impossible to enumer-
ate the illustrations in which specific performance should not be
granted. Thus, the legislature properly left this decision to the court's
discretion in accordance with sound judicial principles.
III. CONCLUSION
A contract that is unconscionable or results in an unfair advan-
tage to one of the parties will not be upheld or enforced by a court of
law in India. Considering the special social conditions prevailing in
the country, especially the high degree of illiteracy and the practice of
spiritualism, courts are inclined to protect the party whose will could
be dominated or prevailed upon by another solely to gain an unfair
advantage. The principles of justice, equity, and good conscience de-
vised by courts of equity in England may not completely prevail in
view of legislative enactments like the Indian Contract Act of 1872
and the Specific Relief Act of 1963. The courts, however, are still
influenced by English principles and will apply them whenever a stat-
utory provision is silent or inapplicable.
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